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INTRODUCTION
Humans have marked their bodies with tattoos for thousands of
years, with the earliest examples appearing on female mummies
dating back to 2000 B.C.1 Originally used as a therapeutic means
of relieving joint pain and as a permanent form of amulet during
pregnancy, use of tattoos has evolved into a way of marking people
as belonging to different classes, religious sects, and even
professions.2 While some cultures tattooed only their criminals,
1

Cate Lineberry, Tattoos: The Ancient and Mysterious History, SMITHSONIAN
MAGAZINE (Jan. 1, 2007), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/
tattoo.html.
2
Id.
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others used the permanent markings as a fashion statement.3 In
America in the mid-1900s, tattoos developed a reputation as the
mark of American countercultures, sailors and World War II
veterans.4 Today, many of these religious and personal reasons
continue to motivate the practice of tattooing.
The issue of intellectual property rights in images fixed on
human bodies seems odd considering the constitutional right to do
as we please with our own bodies.5 Only two lawsuits have ever
been brought alleging infringement of copyright in a tattoo. In the
first case, in 2005, tattoo artist Matthew Reed sued NBA star
Rasheed Wallace for the unauthorized use of the tattoo Reed
designed for, and applied to, Wallace, in an advertising campaign
for Nike.6 Reed claimed that both Nike and the advertising firm
Weiden + Kennedy violated the copyright Reed held in the
“Egyptian Family Pencil Drawing” tattooed on Wallace’s arm.7
The parties ultimately settled out of court.8
The second tattoo infringement case made it only slightly
further in the litigation process. In May 2011, Missouri tattoo
artist Victor Whitmill sued Warner Brothers for the use without
permission of Whitmill’s copyrighted tattoo—originally fixed on
the face of the boxer Mike Tyson—on actor Ed Helms’ face in The
Hangover Part II.9 In the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, Chief Judge Catherine D. Perry
recognized Whitmill’s copyright interests in the tattoo, but found
that the harm to the public interest that would result if the
3

Id.
Cassandra Franklin-Barbajosa, Tattoo: Pigments of Imagination, NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE (Dec. 2004), http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ ngm/0412/
online_extra.html.
5
See infra notes 30, 154–157 and accompanying text.
6
See generally Complaint, Reed v. Nike, CV 05 198, 2005 WL 1182840 (D. Or.
2005) [hereinafter Reed Complaint].
7
Associated Press, Artist Sues over Use of Tattoo, ESPN.COM (Feb. 16, 2005),
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/sportsbusiness/news/story?id=1992812.
8
Noam Cohen, On Tyson’s Face, It’s Art. On Film, a Legal Issue., N.Y. TIMES, May
20,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/21/business/media/21tattoo.html?page
wanted= 2&seid=auto&smid=tw-nytimes.
9
Matthew Belloni, Warner Bros. Settles “Hangover II” Tattoo Lawsuit (Exclusive),
THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (June 20, 2011, 1:39 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.
com/thr-esq/warner-bros-settles-hangover-ii-203377.
4
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preliminary injunction sought by Whitmill were granted
outweighed any such interests.10
Accordingly, she denied
Whitmill’s motion for an injunction, ensuring the release of The
Hangover Part II.11
Both Reed and Whitmill implicated numerous interests: the
copyright interests of the tattoo artist, the copyright interests of the
subject, the right of a person to control his body, and the interests
of the public in reaping the benefits of artist creativity. These
cases also illustrate two main copyright infringement problems that
may arise with tattoos: (1) the direct copying of a popular
copyrighted tattoo onto another “canvas” (in Whitmill, the direct
copying of Whitmill’s design onto Helms’s face without
permission); and (2) the appearance of an original tattoo in a
subsequent work (for example, Tyson’s appearance in the movie
and Wallace’s appearance in the commercial could violate the
owner’s exclusive rights to reproduce the work and to display the
work publicly).12
Resolving the conflicts among the various parties’ interests and
resolving issues of tattoo infringement requires first addressing the
copyrightability of tattoos and then, assuming tattoos are in fact
copyrightable, determining the ownership interests in the tattoo.
This Note will focus on conflicts that arise with regard to
original tattoo designs, as opposed to tattoos featuring alreadycopyrighted or trademarked images. The analysis and argument
will consider only those issues that arise when an original tattoo
design is copied onto another person or is featured in a subsequent
work. This Note argues that when considering such issues, courts
should balance the interests of the artist, the human subject, and
the general public.
Ultimately, courts resolving tattoo

10

Yvette Joy Liebesman, Copyright and Tattoos: Hangover II Injunction Denied, but
the Copyright Owner Got Some Good News Too, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG
(May 24, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/05/copyright_and_t.htm.
11
See id.
12
Two of a copyright owner’s six exclusive rights include the right to reproduce and to
display the work publicly. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), 106(5). While Whiltmill could have
claimed an infringement of this right by Tyson’s appearing in the film, Whitmill has
granted Tyson permission to make such appearances. He has, however, denied Tyson the
right to reproduce the work in other forms. See Liebesman, supra note 10.
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infringement cases should afford thinner copyright protection to
tattoos than they would to other copyrighted works. Part I outlines
the provisions of copyright law relevant to the analysis of the
copyrightability of tattoos. Part II illustrates the conflicts that arise
among the various interests at stake, explains what courts have
done when faced with these conflicts, and notes several problems
that arise in tattoo infringement cases. Part III proposes a solution
to these conflicts and offers a guide to future courts addressing the
issues of copyright interests in body tattoos.
I. COPYRIGHT LAW UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF
1976
This Part reviews the provisions of copyright law relevant to
the analysis of copyrights in the tattoo context, including types of
copyrightable work, forms of copyright ownership, exclusive
rights of copyright owners, the doctrine of fair use, and remedies
for infringement. It also provides a background of the policy
underlying modern copyright law and an overview of the goals of
the 1976 Copyright Act.
A. Policy Underlying the Copyright Act
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to
promote science and the useful arts by granting copyright
ownership to authors of original works.13 The main goal of
providing authors with a limited monopoly in the rights to their
creations is to stimulate and incentivize artistic creativity for the
good of the general public.14 Thus, in the analysis of copyrights
and tattoos, public interest plays an important role, in addition to
the interests of the artist and the subject.15
For purposes of copyright law, a work is “created” the first
time it is fixed in a copy.16 Ownership of the work vests initially
13

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
15
For example, public interest weighed heavily in Judge Perry’s decision to deny
Whitmill’s request for a preliminary injunction in Whitmill v. Warner Bros. See
Liebesman, supra note 10.
16
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
14
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in the author who transcribes an idea into a fixed, tangible
expression that is entitled to copyright protection.17 If an
expression meets this requirement, section 106 of the Copyright
Act grants the author a number of exclusive rights in the work.18
The author may then transfer ownership of all or some of these
rights to another party.19 For example, the author may retain the
right to prepare derivative works, but may transfer the rights to
distribute and reproduce the original work to someone better suited
to maximize the benefits of those rights. Therefore, permitting the
transfer of some exclusive rights helps to ensure their most
effective use. Defining the author, and thus the owner, of a tattoo
is especially critical because of the potential conflict between the
exclusive rights of a copyright owner and the right of a subject to
control his own body.
B. Classifying the Work
Section 102 of the 1976 Copyright Act defines the eight
eligible categories of copyrightable works.20 How a work is
categorized is important because certain works are subject to
different protections and exclusive rights.21
Tattoos most likely fall under the category of pictorial, graphic
or sculptural works.22 Such works include two-and threedimensional works of “fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs,
prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams,
models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans.”23
A tattoo is, quite literally, applied art (although copyright law

17

See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989). This
principle tends to indicate that ownership vests in the artist who physically creates the
work, however, parties other than the actual creator may be an author for purposes of
copyright law and thus an owner. See discussion infra Part I.C.
18
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
19
17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2006).
20
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
21
For example, owners of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works do not enjoy the
right to publicly perform their work, 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), and owners of works of visual
arts are entitled to the right of attribution and integrity, 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
22
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5).
23
17 U.S.C. § 101.
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contemplates a different meaning for the term “applied art”).24 For
purposes of categorization, a tattoo is undoubtedly graphic art
applied to a three-dimensional canvas and thus may be classified as
a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work.
If a tattoo meets certain statutory requirements, it could qualify
as a “work of visual art.”25 To be a work of visual art, the work
must exist in a single copy or in a “limited edition of 200 copies or
fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.”26
Original tattoos that exist in a single “copy” could be deemed a
work of visual art. However, an artist who applies the same image
to more than one subject would have to sign and consecutively
number each of the works. Given the “canvas” on which tattoo
artists transcribe their work, it would be highly burdensome to
comply with these requirements. Thus, it seems unlikely that
original tattoos appearing in more than one copy could qualify as
works of visual art.
Whether a tattoo is a pictorial, graphical or sculptural work or a
work of visual art is significant to the extent that the classification
affects rights to which the owner of the work is entitled. An owner
of a work of visual art is entitled to the exclusive rights under
section 106 and, additionally, the right of attribution and integrity
under section 106A.27 An owner of a pictorial, graphical or
sculptural work is entitled only to the exclusive rights under
section 106, and does not enjoy the right to publicly perform the
work.28
C. Determining Ownership
It is important to note that ownership of a copyright, or
ownership of any of the exclusive rights of a copyright, “is distinct
from ownership of any material object in which the work is

24

See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5667–68 (distinguishing works of “applied art,” protectable under the Copyright
Act, from works of “industrial design,” which are not afforded protection).
25
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “work of visual art”).
26
Id.
27
17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 106A (2006).
28
17 U.S.C. § 106.
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embodied.”29 Accordingly, even if the author and owner for
purposes of copyright law is deemed to be someone other than the
human subject, that owner only has an interest in the work, and not
in the body of the subject. Even though a tattoo artist who is the
owner of a copyrighted tattoo on another person has no direct
property interest in that person, in exercising some of his exclusive
rights, the owner’s rights will nevertheless interfere with the
subject’s constitutional right to control his own body.30
Depending on the circumstances surrounding the tattoo’s
creation, the “author” of the tattoo, for purposes of determining
initial ownership, could be the tattoo artist (or his employer, in the
work-for-hire context), the human subject, or both.31 In the first
situation, the artist is the sole author and owner. In this scenario,
the tattoo artist is a sole proprietor who, much like a painter or
photographer, owns all of copyright interests in the work from the
moment it is fixed on the subject.
In a second possible scenario, the tattoo is a joint work,
meaning that two or more authors prepared the work with the
intention that their contributions would merge into “inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”32 For example, a subject
contributes specific ideas about, or rough sketches of, what the
tattoo should look like and an artist, literally, embodies those ideas
in the subject.33 Authorship is not the same as merely making a
copyrightable contribution to a work.34 Thus, in a joint work
arrangement, the authors must also intend that their individual
contributions be merged into one whole work.35 Authors of a joint
29

17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (recognizing
a constitutional right to personal autonomy).
31
See Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on the Body: Intellectual
Property Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97,
104–07 (2003).
32
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
33
This process of both parties making creative contributions occurs frequently in the
tattoo context. See, e.g., Reed Complaint, supra note 6, at 3–4.
34
See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1999).
35
17 U.S.C. § 101; see Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1069 (7th Cir.
1994) (noting that the fact that several parties contributed contemporaneously is
insufficient to satisfy the intent requirement); see also Kaplan v. Vincent, 937 F. Supp.
307, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (outlining two factors helpful in determining whether the
30
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work co-own the copyright in the work.36 In the tattoo context,
this ownership arrangement presents the fewest interferences with
the subject’s constitutional right to control his own body; it allows
each owner to use or to license the use of the work so long as he
accounts to the other co-owners for any profits derived from such
use or licensing.37
In a third possible situation, the tattoo is a “work made for
hire.” A work made for hire is a work either prepared by an
employee within the scope of his employment, or “specially
ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work.”38 For purposes of copyright ownership, the employer—or
the other person for whom the work was prepared—is considered
the author, unless the parties have agreed otherwise in a signed
written instrument.39 A tattoo that is a work made for hire might
exist in two different scenarios. In the first, the tattoo parlor that
employs the artist might claim that the work is one made for hire
because it was created within the scope of the artist’s employment
with the company. In this case, the tattoo parlor company is the
author for purposes of copyright ownership. In the second
scenario, the tattoo may constitute a work made for hire if the
subject specially ordered or commissioned the work for use as a
contribution to a collective work.40 Conceivably, one could argue
that a body bearing multiple tattoos is a “collective work,” and by
specially commissioning another tattoo, the multi-tattooed subject
could be the author of the work-for-hire tattoo, provided the parties
signed the requisite written instrument. However, this example
hinges on the classification of multiple tattoos on a human body as

parties had the requisite intent: whether each party intended all parties be identified as coauthors and how the parties “regarded themselves in relation to the work”).
36
17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006).
37
See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994).
38
A “collective work” is a work in which a number of contributions, that constitute
separate and independent works, are assembled into a collective whole. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
A work for hire arrangement only exists, however, “if the parties expressly agree in a
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire.” Id.
39
17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
40
17 U.S.C. § 101.
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a “collective work,” which might be a somewhat far-fetched
classification.41
D. Exclusive Rights
The 1976 Copyright Act grants copyright owners six exclusive
rights with regard to their copyrighted works: (1) to reproduce the
work; (2) to prepare derivative works based on the work; (3) to
distribute the work; (4) to perform the work publicly; (5) to display
the work publicly; and (6) to perform the work publicly by means
of a digital audio transmission.42 The fourth right—to perform the
work publicly—would not apply if a tattoo is deemed a pictorial,
graphical or sculptural work, but would apply if it is a work of
visual art.43 The sixth right—public performance—is irrelevant to
the analysis of copyrighted tattoos.
1. The Right to Reproduce
The first exclusive right under section 106 grants copyright
owners the right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies44 or
phonorecords.”45 There are two threshold requirements associated
with the reproduction right: the fixation requirement and the
intelligibility requirement. To meet the fixation requirement, the
embodiment of the work must be “sufficiently permanent or stable
to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”46 To
satisfy the intelligibility requirement, it is necessary that the fixed
work “can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
either directly, or with the aid of a machine or device.”47 Tattoos
are permanently embodied in a person’s skin; therefore, they may

41
Arguably, each tattoo on a single subject could constitute a “separate and
independent work.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The problem in making this argument is
establishing that the individual works are assembled into a “collective whole,” in the way
that individual articles are assembled into the collective work of a newspaper. Id.
42
17 U.S.C. § 106.
43
Id.
44
“Copies” consist of material objects in which the work is fixed. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
45
17 U.S.C. § 106.
46
17 U.S.C. § 101.
47
Id.
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be perceived for more than a period of “transitory duration”48 and
satisfy the fixation requirement. Furthermore, people perceive
tattoos directly—simply by looking at them—thus, they also
satisfy the intelligibility requirement. Tattoos are both fixed and
intelligible; therefore, an owner of a copyrighted tattoo would
enjoy the right to reproduce.
2. The Right to Prepare Derivative Works
A derivative work is a work based on preexisting material that
may be “recast, transformed, or adapted.”49 The Supreme Court
has recognized that the underlying material must be copyrightable
for a work based on that material to qualify as a derivative work
under the statute.50 The language of the statute itself also
establishes the requirement that the underlying work be
copyrightable; under section 106, the copyright owner has the
exclusive right “to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work.”51 Thus, to create a derivative work of a tattoo,
the preexisting tattoo must be copyrightable.
A derivative work consists of modifications, which, as a whole,
represent an “original work of authorship.”52 The Second Circuit
has held that a derivative work is independently copyrightable if it
is “sufficiently original,”53 and established a two-prong test for
determining whether a subsequent work is copyrightable as a
derivative work.54 First, the original aspects of the derivative work
must be “more than trivial.”55 Second, the original aspects of the
subsequent work must reflect the degree to which it relies on the
preexisting work and must not affect the scope of the copyright

48

Id.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
50
See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
51
17 U.S.C. § 106 (emphasis added).
52
17 U.S.C. § 101.
53
See Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 782 (2d Cir. 1994).
54
See Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980). The
Ninth Circuit has also adopted this two-prong approach to evaluating the copyrightability
of derivative works. See Entm’t Research Grp., Inc. v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122
F.3d 1211, 1220 (9th Cir. 1997).
55
See Durham, 630 F.2d at 909.
49
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protection in the preexisting material.56 Under the originality
standard articulated above, to create a derivative work of an
original tattoo, an artist would need to do more than simply “touch
up” the work. Under the Second Circuit’s test, assuming that the
modifications or additions to a tattoo are sufficiently original and
substantial to rise to the level of an independently copyrightable
work, it is possible to create a derivative work of a tattoo.
Where a tattoo artist is also the owner of the copyright in a
tattoo, as one of his exclusive rights he is entitled to prepare
derivative works of that tattoo. In this scenario, enforcing the
artist’s right to prepare derivative works could give rise to several
problems given the constitutional right of a person to control his or
her body.57
3. The Right to Distribute
Copyright owners also enjoy the right to distribute copies of
their work to the public “by sale or other transfer of ownership, or
by rental, lease, or lending.”58 Because of the nature of the
medium in which the tattoo is fixed, distribution in the tattoo
context is decidedly different than distribution in the context of
more traditional media such as books or computer software. This
right is unlikely to be infringed in the tattoo context given that
tattoos are fixed upon human skin. However, in the practice of
tattooing, artists often create sketches or stencils of their designs.
If an artist copyrights a particular tattoo and fixes that image in a
separate and independently copyrightable tattoo sketch or stencil,
he may claim his exclusive right to distribute copies of the stencils
to other tattoo parlors or artists.
4. The Rights to Perform Publicly and to Display Publicly
Owners of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works are entitled
to the exclusive right to display the work publicly, but not to
perform the work publicly.59 Owners of works of visual art enjoy

56
57
58
59

See id.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
17 U.S.C. § 106(4)–(5).
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both the right to perform and to display their works publicly.60
However, this is a distinction without any significance in the
context of tattoos; whether the author is entitled to the right to
publicly perform makes no difference because tattoos cannot be
“performed.”61
Regardless of whether the tattoo is pictorial, graphic or
sculptural or one of visual art, the owner has the exclusive right to
have the work displayed in public. Where the tattoo artist is also
the copyright owner, enforcement of this right will present a
significant conflict with the subject’s right to bodily autonomy. In
the absence of an implied license to have his tattoo publicly
visible, a subject would infringe the artist’s right under section
106(4) or section 106(5) any time he appears in public.62 To avoid
such infringement, the subject would need to cover the tattoo when
venturing into the public realm. Of all of the rights granted to
copyright holders, enforcement of the right to display publicly
presents the greatest likelihood of interfering with a subject’s right
to personal autonomy.63
5. The Rights of Certain Authors to Attribution and Integrity
While the right to attribution and integrity is not one of the six
exclusive rights granted to copyright owners under section 106, it
is a right enjoyed by authors of works of visual arts.64 Under this
right, an owner of a tattoo classified as a work of visual art is
entitled to “prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her
honor or reputation.”65 It is unlikely that many tattoos would meet
the statutory requirements of a work of visual art. However, where

60

See id.
“To ‘perform’ a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or
by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it
audible.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
62
See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
63
See infra Part III.C (discussing why this right should belong to the human subject
either implicitly or by written instrument before tattoo’s creation).
64
17 U.S.C. § 106(A).
65
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A). “The authors of a joint work of visual art are co-owners
of the rights conferred by subsection (a) in that work.” 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b).
61
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a tattoo does qualify as such a work, the right to attribution and
integrity afforded to the owner of the work could present additional
conflicts with the subject’s right to bodily autonomy. Arguably,
where a tattooed subject decided to alter his tattoo, or perhaps even
remove it, the artist (if he were the owner) would have the right to
prevent such a modification. As with the enforcement of an
artist/owner’s right to public display, enforcing the right to
attribution and integrity could potentially conflict with the
subject’s constitutional right to control his own body.
E. Fair Use as a Defense
In some cases, the doctrine of fair use66 may be a relevant
defense to the unauthorized use of a copyrighted tattoo.67 In such
instances, the conflicts between an artist/owner’s enforcement of
his exclusive rights and the subject’s right to control his body may
be resolved by invoking a fair use defense.
The Supreme Court has recognized fair use as a safeguard in
copyright law for balancing the interests of copyright owners in
controlling their works with the free speech and expression
interests of both subsequent authors and the general public.68
Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act provides that the use of a
copyrighted work for purposes such as “criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research” generally does not
infringe the copyright.69 Essentially, fair use allows authors to
draw upon preexisting works for purposes of criticizing,
66

Courts consider four relevant factors when determining whether the unauthorized
use of a copyrighted work is nonetheless a non-infringing fair use: (1) the purpose and
character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and (4)
the effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the copyright work. 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (2006). The fair use doctrine is not a bright line test and requires case-by-case
analysis. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
Furthermore, no one factor is dispositive. See id.
67
For example, in Whitmill v. Warner Bros., Warner Brothers argued that its
unauthorized use of Whitmill’s copyrighted tattoo on Helms’ face was a non-infringing
fair use because it parodied Tyson’s original tattoo. See Warner Bros. Memo. in
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Prelim. Injunction, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t,
No. 4:11-cv-752 (E.D. Mo. 2011) [hereinafter Warner Bros. Memo.].
68
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
69
17 U.S.C. § 107.
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disseminating news, teaching or commentary in order to further
Congress’s and the Copyright Act’s goals of promoting science
and the useful arts and stimulating creativity.70
Fair use of a copyrighted tattoo is most likely to occur in the
form of parody or in the course of news reporting. For instance, in
television shows such as Saturday Night Live, or in comedic films
such as The Hangover Part II, filmmakers might directly copy a
well-known tattoo in order to conjure up the original work and to
comment on or criticize either the preexisting work or the subject
on which it appears.71 In such cases, it is likely the use would
qualify as a protected parody of the original work. Additionally, in
instances where a paparazzo photographs a visibly tattooed
celebrity and publishes the photo without permission, such “use”
of the original work could also be protected as a fair form of news
reporting.72
F. Remedies
A copyright owner must register his copyright before an
infringement occurs to be eligible to receive statutory damages and
attorney’s fees under section 504(c).73 Section 412 of the
Copyright Act aims to ensure that such damages are reserved for
those infringers who had constructive notice that the work upon
which they infringed was protected by a valid copyright, which is
presumed upon the owner’s registration of the work.74
G. Actual Damages
A copyright owner may recover actual damages suffered as
result of infringement, as well as the infringer’s profits that are
attributable to the infringement and that are not considered in

70

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 107.
See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, 591–94 (holding that the potentially infringing
artist’s song was a valid parody that necessarily mimicked the original song in order to
criticize and comment on it).
72
See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (deeming
newsworthy the day-to-day actions of public figures).
73
17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006).
74
See Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 505 (6th Cir. 1998).
71

C07_HATIC (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

1/5/2013 2:36 PM

WHO OWNS YOUR BODY ART?

411

computing the actual damages.75 Generally, courts aim to award
damages proportionate to the copyright owner’s damages, and no
more.76 In Whitmill, Whitmill sought both compensatory damages
as well as the portion of Warner Brothers’ profits from The
Hangover Part II.77 Had the case reached the stage where the
court would calculate damages, Whitmill could have potentially
received any actual damages resulting from the infringement, as
well as a portion of Warner Brothers’ profits from the film that the
court deemed attributable to the infringement of Whitmill’s tattoo.
However, for a plaintiff to be entitled to damages for indirect
profits from the unauthorized use of infringing material, there must
be a “legally sufficient causal link” between the infringement and
any subsequent indirect profits.78
H. Statutory Damages
If an owner registered his copyright prior to the infringement
then, before a final judgment is rendered, the owner may choose to
recover statutory damages instead of actual damages and profits in
an amount of no less than $750 and no more than $30,000.79
Infringement plaintiffs tend to select statutory damages in cases
where there are no actual damages, where actual damages are
particularly difficult to calculate, or where actual damages are
considerably less than statutory ones. In tattoo infringement cases,
actual damages would likely be considerably lower than the range
of damages available through the statute. For example, courts have
75

17 U.S.C. § 504(b). A successful infringement plaintiff may receive a portion of
direct profits attributable to the infringing material as well as indirect profits attributable
to the infringing work. See Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d
505, 514 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that plaintiff was entitled to a portion of defendant’s net
revenue from the show that featured the infringing material, as well as a portion of
indirect profits attributable to the infringing material, including profits from related hotel
and gambling operations).
76
See, e.g., Frank Music Corp., 772 F.2d at 517–20. (conducting extensive
mathematical analysis to determine proportion of defendants’ profits attained due to
infringing material).
77
See Complaint, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 4:11-cv-752, 2011 WL
2038147 at 8 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Whitmill Complaint].
78
See Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 909, 915 (2002).
79
17 U.S.C. § 505(c)(1) (2006). Should a court find the infringement was committed
willfully, the court may, in its discretion, increase the statutory damages award to not
more than $150,000. 17 U.S.C. § 505(c)(2).
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awarded actual damages for loss of customers due to
infringement,80 lost licensing fees due to infringement,81 and lost
royalty payments due to infringement.82 None of these losses,
however, seem relevant in the tattoo context. It seems highly
unlikely that Reed would have lost customers as a result of Nike’s
commercial featuring Wallace’s Egyptian tattoo. If anything, such
infringement was the “exposure” Reed hoped to benefit from by
having his work fixed to a popular NBA player.83 Thus, in tattoo
cases where actual damages are extremely low, difficult to prove
or nonexistent, infringement plaintiffs may still recover monetary
damages under the statutory provisions.
I. Injunctive Relief
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, a court may grant a temporary
or permanent injunction where it deems such relief reasonable to
prevent copyright infringement.84 Under the Supreme Court’s
holding in eBay v. MercExchange, courts must evaluate the
traditional four factors considered in injunctive relief before
granting a final injunction.85 In the tattoo context, injunctive relief
could be sought to prevent, inter alia, the unauthorized copying of
the work onto other canvases, the release of subsequent works
featuring the tattoo, and the attempt of the original subject to
modify or remove the work. Each of these requests would create a
80
See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Applied Innovations, 685 F. Supp. 698,
711–12 (D. Minn. 1987).
81
See, e.g., Cream Records, Inc. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 754 F.2d 826, 829 (9th
Cir. 1985) (finding copyright owner entitled to recover value of license where
unauthorized use eliminated owner’s opportunity to license song).
82
See, e.g., Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. and Scientific Commc’n Ltd., 891 F. Supp.
935, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (awarding actual damages for lost royalty payments plaintiff
would have received for use of its source code in the absence of infringement).
83
See Associated Press, Artist Sues Over Use of Tattoo, ESPN.COM (Feb. 16, 2005),
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/sportsbusiness/news/story?id=1992812.
84
17 U.S.C. § 502 (2006).
85
547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). To be entitled to injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show:
(1) that it suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law are inadequate
to compensate for the injury; (3) that considering the balance of the hardships between
the plaintiff and the defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. See id. at 391–92. While this
case arose in the patent context, the Court noted that the rule established in eBay is
consistent with the treatment of injunctions under the Copyright Act. Id at 392.
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great deal of conflict with not only the public interest in benefitting
from artist creativity and in exercising the right of free expression,
but also with the constitutional right to control one’s own body.86
Because of these conflicts, courts should be especially wary of
granting injunctive relief to tattoo infringement plaintiffs.
II. CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS
Part II examines the interests at stake in cases of copyrighted
tattoos and illustrates the conflicts that arise among these various
interests. This Part also highlights how courts have handled
conflicts among the parties’ interests. Finally, Part II examines the
policy arguments for and against granting tattoos the same degree
of copyright protection as more traditional works.
A. Two Infringement Scenarios
The two lawsuits involving the unauthorized use of a
copyrighted tattoo87 present the two main infringement problems
that may arise with original art works tattooed on human bodies:
(1) the direct copying of the original tattoo onto another person or
medium of expression, and (2) when the artist is also the copyright
owner, the appearance of the original subject bearing the tattoo in a
subsequent work without permission of the owner.88
B. Tattoos, Copyrights, and the Courts
Interestingly, very little case law exists in the realm of
copyrights and tattoos. Indeed, Whitmill is only the second lawsuit
in which a tattoo artist sued for copyright infringement of a work
of body art.89 In Whitmill, despite openly empathizing with the
86

See infra Parts II.C–D.
See generally Reed Complaint, supra note 6; Warner Bros. Memo., supra note 67.
88
While in this case Whitmill did not actually sue Mike Tyson for appearing in the
film without permission, this potential infringement claim is one that could arise in cases
similar to this one. See Liebesman, supra note 10. This was the issue in Reed.
89
See Matthew Heller, Tyson Tattoo Creates Legal Headache for “Hangover 2,” ON
POINT NEWS (May 1, 2011), http://www.onpointnews.com/NEWS/Tyson-Tattoo-CreatesLegal-Headache-for-Hangover-2.html. Also in 2005, artist Louis Molloy, who applied
nine of soccer star David Beckham’s tattoos, threatened to sue Beckham when he
discovered Beckham wanted to use some of the tattoos in an advertising campaign. See
87
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tattoo artist Whitmill, Judge Perry of the Eastern District of
Missouri denied the artist’s request to enjoin the release of The
Hangover Part II, finding that the public interest in having the film
released far outweighed Whitmill’s copyright interests in his tattoo
design.90 In the other tattoo copyright infringement case, Reed v.
Nike, the parties settled.91 Although the case was never litigated,
examining this lawsuit’s facts reveals that similar conflicts among
interests arise in cases of alleged infringement of tattoos.
1. Whitmill v. Warner Brothers
In 2003, Victor Whitmill designed an original tattoo for the
former heavyweight champion Mike Tyson.92 On the day
Whitmill applied the tattoo to Tyson’s face, Tyson signed a
“Tattoo Release Form” acknowledging, “all artwork, sketches and
drawings related to [his] tattoo and any photographs of [his] tattoo
are property of Paradox-Studio of Dermagraphics.”93 Although
ownership vests in the author at the time of fixation,94 Whitmill did
not officially register his work with the Copyright Office until
April of 2011.95 In 2009, Tyson appeared in The Hangover, a
movie released by Warner Brothers.96 Whitmill did not object to
Tyson’s appearance in the film or to the use of Tyson’s tattoo in
the advertising and promotion for the film.97 In 2011, Tyson
appeared in The Hangover Part II, the sequel to The Hangover.98
In The Hangover Part II, one of the main characters, played by

Fiona Cummins & Sharon Feinstein, Exclusive: I Own Beck’s Tattoo . . . and I’ll Sue,
DAILY MIRROR (June 27, 2005), http://www.mirror.co.uk/celebs/news/2005/06/27/
exclusive-i-own-beck-s-tattoo-and-i-ll-sue-115875-15668908.
90
See Noam Cohen, Citing Public Interest, Judge Rules for “Hangover II”, N.Y.
TIMES (May 24, 2011, 4:05pm), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/
citing-public-interest-judge-rules-for-hangover-ii.
91
See Cohen, supra note 8.
92
See Heller, supra note 89.
93
See Whitmill Complaint, supra note 77, at 3.
94
See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
95
Warner Bros. Memo., supra note 67, at 9.
96
Id. at 5–6.
97
Id. at 6.
98
Id. at 5–7.
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actor Ed Helms, appears in the film bearing an almost identical
facial tattoo to that of Mike Tyson.99

100

Warner Brothers used footage of Helms sporting the tattoo in
its trailer for the film and in other advertising and promotional
materials.101 Subsequently, Whitmill filed a complaint against
Warner Brothers alleging copyright infringement of his original
tattoo.102 In his complaint, Whitmill sought a preliminary and a
permanent injunction, enjoining Warner Brothers from using the
tattoo on Ed Helms’ face “in the Movie and otherwise.”103
Whitmill also sought compensatory damages and an award of
Warner Brothers’ profits resulting from the alleged
infringement.104

99

Id. at 8.
David Kravets, Warner Bros. Sued for Using Mike Tyson’s Tattoo in New Movie,
WIRED (May 2, 2011, 2:54 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/05/infringingtattoo.
101
Warner Bros.’ Memo., supra note 67, at 8.
102
See generally Whitmill Complaint, supra note 77.
103
See id.
104
See id.
100
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105

106

In his action, Whitmill sued only Warner Brothers and brought
no claim against Tyson.107 Thus, the second infringement
situation—where a copyrighted tattoo on a person appears in a
subsequent work without the owner’s permission—is not at issue
here. The court’s decision in Whitmill is quite brief and sheds light
only on how to handle an instance of direct copying of an original
tattoo without permission of the copyright owner.
C. The Parody Defense
Warner Brothers argued first that tattoos should not be entitled
to any copyright protection.108 Alternatively, Warner Brothers
argued that even if the court recognized a copyright interest in the
tattoo, the film’s use of the tattoo was permissible under the fair
use doctrine and thus did not infringe upon Whitmill’s
copyright.109 Judge Perry rejected Warner Brother’s defense of
fair use.110 She ruled that the “tattoo” on Ed Helms’ face in the
105

The Hangover Part II (2011), THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE (last visited Oct. 11,
2012), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1411697.
106
The Hangover Part 2 Poster: Ed Helms, ABOUT.COM (last visited Oct. 11, 2012),
http://movies.about.com/od/thehangover2/ig/Hangover-2-Posters/Ed-Helms-Poster.htm.
107
Warner Bros. Memo., supra note 67, at 18; see Liebesman, supra note 10.
108
Warner Bros. Memo., supra note 67, at 13.
109
Kal Raustiala & Chris Sprigman, Can You Copyright a Tattoo?, FREAKONOMICS
(May 2, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2011/05/02/can-you-copyrighta-tattoo.
110
See Matthew David, Tyson Tattoo Trouble, LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION (May 25,
2011), http://www.likelihoodofconfusion.com/tyson-tattoo-trouble. Should this case
have been appealed and a different court have the fair use analysis,Warner Brothers may
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film was an exact copy that “did not comment on the artist’s work
or have any critical bearing on the original composition.”111
Because there was no change to the tattoo, there was no parody.112
In her rejection of Warner Brothers’ fair use defense, Judge Perry
also noted that the use of the tattoo on Helms’ face was not
necessary to the movie plot and that Warner Brothers used the
tattoo extensively in its marketing and promotion of the movie.113
She also found that the plaintiff met his burden of proving
irreparable harm by showing the “loss of control over his
design.”114
D. Balancing the Interests
Ultimately Judge Perry ruled that the “balancing of the equities
and the harm to the public if the injunction were granted” weighed
in favor of Warner Brothers.115 She recognized that Whitmill had
a copyright interest in the tattoo and that his interest was infringed
by Warner Brother’s use, but excused the use anyway on the
grounds of “public interest.”116 It is interesting that though she
excused the use and denied the injunction, she did so in the name
of public interest instead of using the statutory excuse of fair use—
especially where the parody argument was arguably quite strong.
Whitmill illustrates that the underlying policy behind the
Copyright Act—to promote science and the useful arts for the
overall benefit of the public—supports heavily weighing the public
have a better chance of asserting its transformative use defense. See, e.g., Yvette J.
Liebesman, Copyright and Tattoos: Hangover II Injunction Denied, but the Copyright
Owner Got Some Good News Too—Whitmill v. Warner Bros.; ERIC GOLDMAN: TECH &
MKTG. LAW BLOG, (May 24, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives
/2011/05/copyright_and_t.htm.
111
See id. This finding indicates that Judge Perry rejected Warner Brothers’ argument
that the subsequent use of the tattoo was transformative under the first prong of the fair
use defense. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
112
See David, supra note 110.
113
See Liebesman, supra note 10. These notes suggest that Judge Perry determined
that the commercial nature of the use and the lack of transformativeness of the use
weighed against a finding of fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
114
Joe Mullin, Tyson Tattoo Lawsuit: Studio’s Defenses Are ‘Silly’, Says Judge,
PAIDCONTENT.ORG (May 24, 2011, 5:20 PM), http://paidcontent.org/article/419-judgeshows-sympathy-for-plaintiffs-in-tyson-tattoo-case.
115
See Liebesman, supra note 10.
116
See id.
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interest when determining whether to grant injunctive relief to a
tattoo infringement plaintiff.
E. Reed v. Nike
While the lawsuit involving the Oregon tattoo artist Matthew
Reed and the tattoo on the NBA star Rasheed Wallace was never
litigated, the facts reveal that similar interests are implicated in
other cases involving a subsequent, unauthorized use of a
copyrighted tattoo.
1. The Facts
The only tattoo copyright infringement case besides Whitmill v.
Warner Bros. involved tattoo artist Matthew Reed, who sued Nike
and an advertising company after Nike used the design that he had
created for NBA player Rasheed Wallace in an advertising
campaign.117 In 1998, Reed met with Wallace to discuss the art
design that would become the tattoo.118 During the initial meeting,
Wallace signed an “Information and Release Document,” which
was the only written agreement between the parties and which did
not mention any assignment of Reed’s copyright interest in the
work.119 In a second meeting, Wallace proposed changes to the
sketch Reed had drawn120 and, over course of three sessions, Reed
applied the tattoo to Wallace.121 Wallace paid Reed $450, which
Reed considered a low price but believed was worth the exposure
he and his business would get from his tattoo appearing on an
NBA player.122

117
118
119
120
121
122

See Heller, supra note 89.
See Reed Complaint, supra note 6, at 3–4.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3–4.
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In 2004, Reed learned that Wallace’s tattoo was featured as
part of a Nike advertising campaign.125 Reed was never contacted
about the use of his original artwork in the form of Wallace’s
tattoo in the commercial.126 Reed had registered a copyright for
the “Egyptian Family Pencil Drawing” that was the basis of the
tattoo he applied to Wallace’s arm.127 Reed sued Nike and the
advertising firm Weiden + Kennedy, alleging that the defendants
“copied, reproduced, distributed, adapted and/or publicly
displayed” his copyrighted work without his consent.128
2. The Conflicts
This case involves conflicting interests among the copyright
ownership interests of the artist, the right to publicity of the
subject, and the right of the public to benefit from subsequent
works featuring a unique and noteworthy tattoo on a popular
basketball player.
In this case, Reed was the sole author and owner of the
copyrighted tattoo. While Wallace and Reed worked together to
develop the design, their mere collaboration was insufficient to
establish intent to create a joint work or to establish a work for hire
arrangement.129 Because Reed was the sole owner of the
copyrighted work and Nike and its advertising agency used it in a

123

Rasheed Wallace, THE ATHLETE TATTOO DATABASE (last visited Oct. 11, 2012),
http://athletetattoodatabase.com/Rasheed+Wallace.
124
Id.
125
See Reed Complaint, supra note 6, at 4.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
See id. at 4–5.
129
See discussion supra Part I.C.
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subsequent work without Reed’s permission, the use infringed
Reed’s exclusive rights.
Through the right of publicity, Wallace had an interest in
promoting his own name and likeness, including the part of his
body featuring his tattoo. The right of publicity is “the inherent
right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or
her identity.”130 Here, while Reed undoubtedly held a copyright
interest in the tattoo and thus had a right to prevent unauthorized
reproduction, public display or derivative works, Wallace also
undoubtedly had a right to exploit his persona—including his
tattoo—in his endorsement deal with Nike. Likewise, Nike had an
interest in exploiting Wallace as a spokesperson for its products,
including featuring the elements of his persona that make him a
popular athlete and thus an effective Nike representative. Finally,
the public arguably had an interest in viewing a work featuring an
interesting tattoo on a popular professional basketball player.
While this case settled out of court, had it reached litigation,
the court would have needed to consider all these competing
interests and not only the copyright interest of the artist. In tattoo
cases, because of the nature of the medium in which the
copyrighted work is fixed, interests including the right to publicity
and the constitutional right to control one’s body must weigh more
heavily in determining whether infringement occurred and in
deciding whether to award damages or injunctive relief than in
cases involving more traditional copyrighted works.
F. Policing Problems
Two hypothetical situations developing the problems of direct
copying and featuring a copyrighted tattoo in a subsequent work
will elucidate issues surrounding the policing of infringement in
tattoo cases.

130
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed. Mar.
2011); see Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 413 (9th Cir. 1996)
(defining the right of publicity as meaning, in essence, “that the reaction of the public to
name and likeness, which may be fortuitous or which may be managed and planned,
endows the name and likeness of the person involved with commercially exploitable
opportunities”) (citation omitted).
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First, to illustrate the direct copying problem: a teacher in
Tallahassee, Florida who is an avid Manchester United fan gets a
replica of David Beckham’s guardian angel tattoo inked across his
back. In this scenario, few people will know about the tattoo, and
few will care that it is an unauthorized copy of an original work.
Here, the direct copying of the angel tattoo onto the teacher’s body
undoubtedly infringes upon tattoo artist Louis Molloy’s copyright
of the angel tattoo,131 but who will police this infringement?
Furthermore, which party committed the infringement in this
case—the teacher or the tattoo artist who applied the image to the
teacher?
Second, to illustrate the problem of featuring a copyrighted
tattoo in a subsequent work: a paparazzo snaps a picture of Heidi
Klum in which her wave and star tattoo is clearly visible, and sells
it to People Magazine, who publishes the photo. In this case,
assuming Heidi’s tattoo is copyrighted, is there infringement? Or
is this a fair use of the tattoo because it is being reproduced in the
course of reporting the “news” of a public figure’s day-to-day
activities? If it is infringement, however, who was the infringer—
the photographer, the magazine, or both? Again: who will police
this type of infringement?
G. First Amendment Problems
A major problem with the copying of tattoos and fair use is that
to properly parody a tattooed person for purposes of criticizing or
commenting on them, a large portion, if not all, of the tattoo will
need to be copied.132 For example, to effectively “conjure up”
Mike Tyson, a subject must bear the tribal facial tattoo that has
become inextricably linked with Tyson’s persona.133 A different
tattoo or a tattoo in a different place would simply not be as
compelling and may not even evoke the subject of the parody. In
this example, so long as the use of the original Tyson tattoo is for
131
See Tattoo Jam 2011, BIZARRE MAG, http://www.bizarremag.com/weird-news/
tattoos-body-art/11188/tattoo_jam_2011.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
132
See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588–89 (1994)
(“When parody takes aim at a particular work, the parody must be able to ‘conjure up’ at
least enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable.”).
133
Id.
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purposes of criticizing or commenting on the original work, the use
should qualify as fair under section 107.134
Judge Perry’s fair use analysis in Whitmill presents some fair
use and First Amendment concerns. In her discussion, Judge Perry
determined that Warner Brother’s use of Tyson’s tattoo was not
sufficiently transformative under the first prong of the fair use
analysis because the image that appeared on Helms’ face was
nearly identical to the original work.135 However, this finding
seems to misinterpret the fair use analysis established in section
107 and developed by United States courts. While the amount of
the copyrighted work copied in the Mike Tyson case was arguably
one hundred percent, the purpose and character of the use was
imitation for comic effect that created a new work making
“ridiculous the style and expression of the original.”136 The
Hangover Part II is a comedy about a bachelor party in Thailand
gone awry.137 A running joke in both films centers on the main
characters’ dicey run-ins with Mike Tyson, who plays himself.138
Based on the definition of parody,139 the goal of the Copyright Act
to stimulate artist creativity, and the public policy supporting
findings of fair use to encourage freedom of expression, Judge
Perry should have found fair use of the tattoo in this case. If her
analysis and outcome is applied in future cases similar to this one,
the standard for and burden of establishing fair use will be
significantly higher. If subsequent authors are not allowed to copy
copyrighted tattoos, even in the name of a parody or fair use, this

134

The policy behind finding uses such as these to be fair uses stems from the desire to
promote both artist creativity as well as the freedom of speech and expression. See
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
135
See David, supra note 110.
136
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994); Roger v.
Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309–10 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Parody . . . is when one artist, for comic
effect or social commentary, closely imitates the style of another artist and in so doing
creates a new art work that makes ridiculous the style and expression of the original.”).
137
See The Hangover Part II (2011), INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE (May 26, 2011),
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1411697.
138
Cohen, supra note 8.
139
See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992).
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restriction could have serious ramifications on the ability to
exercise the freedom of speech and expression.140
III. MEMORIALIZE THE AGREEMENT, BALANCE THE
INTERESTS
Part III suggests some solutions that might mitigate the
conflicts among interests that arise in tattoo infringement cases and
offers a guide to future courts addressing the issues of copyright
interests in body tattoos. The threshold question that must be
addressed when determining the interests of tattoo artists and tattoo
bearers is, are tattoos even copyrightable? Then, it must be asked,
whether tattoos are or are not copyrightable, is, should they be
copyrightable? It seems that as long as tattoos meet the statutory
requirements, they should be afforded at least some copyright
protection. However, given the interests implicated in tattoo cases
(most notably, the interest of a human subject in controlling his
own body), copyrighted tattoos should not enjoy the same degree
of protection as other copyrighted works.
A. Can You Copyright a Tattoo?
Before Whitmill v. Warner Brothers in 2011, no court had ever
directly addressed the question as to whether copyrights are in fact
copyrightable.141 However, there is some statutory guidance
regarding this issue. The Copyright Act explicitly establishes the
requirements for copyright protection: the work must be an
“original work of authorship” and it must be “fixed in a tangible
medium of expression.”142 If tattoo designs that satisfy the
originality requirement were fixed on paper or on a canvas, they

140

Joe Mullin, Should Copyright Apply to Mike Tyson’s Facial Tattoo?,
(May 2, 2011, 2:50 PM), http://paidcontent.org/article/419-miketyson-tattooist-tries-to-block-hangover-2-with-copyright-suit.
141
David Post, For the “Life Imitates Law School Exam” File: Tattoo Copyright, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 25, 2011, 11:16 am), http://volokh.com/2011/05/25/for-thelife-imitates-law-school-exam-file-tattoo-copyright. Without analyzing the issue, Judge
Perry simply accepted tattoos as copyrightable works and moved on to the remainder of
the analysis. See David, supra note 110 (quoting Judge Perry as insisting, “[o]f course
tattoos can be copyrighted . . . I don’t think there is any reasonable dispute about that”).
142
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
PAIDCONTENT.ORG
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would undoubtedly receive copyright protection. Thus, the
difficult question is whether a human body qualifies as a “tangible
medium of expression” for purposes of earning copyright
protection.143
Based on the statutory language, the human body does seem to
qualify as such a medium. Under the 1976 Copyright Act, a work
is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” when the
embodiment of the work in a material object is “sufficiently
permanent . . . to permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”144
Tattoos are permanently fixed onto a person’s skin and thus can be
perceived by others for more than “transitory duration.” They are
at least perceivable for the duration of the human subject’s
lifetime. Assuming that such a time period qualifies as “more than
transitory,” tattoos can satisfy the statutory requirements and
should be entitled to at least some protection under the Act.
Part of addressing the question “are tattoos copyrightable?”
involves determining what constitutes the original work. There are
two possible original work determinations in the tattoo context: the
sketch, stencil or drawing that precedes the application of the
tattoo, and the body tattoo itself. Usually, before permanently
applying the image to the subject, tattoo artists prepare the image
in the form of a sketch or drawing or create a tattoo stencil known
as a “flash.”145 The drawings, sketches or stencils can be
independently copyrightable providing they comply with the
statutory requirements of originality and fixation.146 Arguably, if
an artist copyrighted an image fixed in the form of a tattoo stencil
and then applied that image onto a human subject, he would be
creating a derivative work of the original stencil in a different
medium.147 In this case, the derivative body tattoo would be based
on a copyrighted work as required by the statute,148 and would

143

Id.
Id.
145
What Is Tattoo Flash?, ESSORTMENT, http://www.essortment.com/tattoo-flash29579.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).
146
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
147
See supra Part I.D.2.
148
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
144
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consist of sufficient modifications (i.e., transcribing it onto a new
medium) as to make it an “original work of authorship.”149 This
scenario—where the tattoo is merely a derivative work of an
original stencil, sketch or drawing—seems to eliminate many of
the concerns associated with a tattoo subject appearing in public or
in subsequent works. In this situation, the subject has a
nonexclusive license150 to “use” original work embodied in the
drawing or stencil.151
In a second possible situation, the creation of a tattoo on a
human body might not constitute a derivative work of an original
sketch or drawing, but an original work in and of itself. Few
would argue that Picasso’s Guernica is merely a derivative work
simply because he sketched out several versions of it before
committing the final copy to a canvas. Similarly, a tattoo stencil,
while potentially an independently copyrightable work, need not
be defined as the original work from which the subsequent body
tattoo is derived. Where the tattoo itself is the original work, the
human subject would not be a licensee of an original work, but
rather would be the medium in which an original work is fixed and
expressed. This scenario is the one in which the conflicts outlined
above arise.152
The amount and degree of conflicting interests that arise in the
situation where the artist is the owner and the tattoo is the original
work beg the question: Even if tattoos are copyrightable, should
they be?
B. Should You Be Able to Copyright a Tattoo?
In Whitmill v. Warner Bros., the noted copyright scholar David
Nimmer submitted an affidavit on behalf of defendant Warner
Brothers arguing that the human body cannot qualify as a “medium

149

17 U.S.C. § 101.
A nonexclusive license is an implied license that does not require a written
agreement and does not transfer any ownership of the copyrighted work to the licensee.
See I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d. 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996).
151
See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
152
See discussion supra Part II.
150
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of expression” for purposes of the 1976 Copyright Act.153 Because
a human body is the material object in which a tattoo is fixed, as
opposed to a piece of paper or a DVD, the analysis of
copyrightability and the extent of copyright protection allowed
must necessarily be different for tattoos than that of traditional
copyrightable works. However, because tattoos satisfy the
statutory requirements for copyrightability, as explained above, it
would be unwise to completely dismiss their copyright protections
simply because the “medium of expression” is the human body.
Tattoos present a unique problem not implicated in other forms
of copyrightable works, primarily because the material object in
which the work is fixed is a human body. Because a body is
involved, some of the rights of copyright owners of tattoos will
necessarily interfere with the constitutionally recognized right to
control one’s body.154 For example, if the artist is the copyright
owner, his exclusive right to prepare derivative works based on the
original work might suggest that he is free to alter or modify the
tattoo at will.155 However, the right to prepare such works clearly
conflicts with the subject’s right to bodily autonomy.156
Furthermore, if the artist is the copyright owner and the tattoo is
classified as a work of visual art, the owner has the right to prevent
any “intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification” of
the work that would prejudice his “honor or reputation.”157 Again,
if the artist were allowed to enforce this right against a subject who
wishes to modify or remove the tattoo, the enforcement would
interfere with the subject’s constitutional right to control his body.

153

Declaration of David Nimmer, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 4:11-cv-752
(E.D. Mo. May 20, 2011). These statements seem odd considering that in his copyright
treatise (Nimmer on Copyright), Nimmer claims the exact opposite. See Joe Mullin,
Tyson Tattoo Lawsuit: Studio’s Defenses Are “Silly,” Says Judge, PAIDCONTENT.ORG
(May 24, 2011, 5:20 PM), http://paidcontent.org/article/419-judge-shows-sympathy-forplaintiffs-in-tyson-tattoo-case.
154
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
155
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
156
Perry v. St. Francis Hosp., 886 F. Supp. 1551, n.9 (E.D. Kan. 1995) (noting that
Congress has defined “human organ” to include skin) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 247e(c)(1)
(2006)).
157
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2006).
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Both of these examples suggest that, if courts were to treat the
rights of copyright owners of tattoos the same as the rights of other
copyright owners, subjects would not be allowed to have their
tattoos modified by another artist or to have their tattoos removed
entirely. These restrictions on the subject’s abilities would create a
significant conflict between the subject’s right to bodily autonomy
and the copyright interests of the artist. This conflict unique to
tattoos indicates that copyright protection of tattoos should be
enforced differently—and to a lesser extent—than that of other
copyrightable works.
C. Solving the Tattoo Infringement Problems
There are two ways of solving the potential infringement
problems associated with tattoos. First, requiring a written
agreement at the time the tattoo is applied would clarify questions
of ownership and would allow the parties to determine what may
be done with the original work. Alternatively, in situations where
a copyrighted tattoo appears in subsequent works without the
owner’s permission (assuming the artist is the owner), courts
should recognize an implied license for the subject to appear in
such works.
1. Writing Requirement
Requiring a written instrument or a contract detailing who
owns the work and providing what the subject can do with the
work would eliminate a great deal of confusion in tattoo copyright
infringement cases. This solution seems best suited to the
problems caused by cases involving celebrity tattoos, which seem
to be the most likely to occur given the highly visible nature of
celebrities and the popularity of unique tattoos among celebrities.
Public figures and celebrities negotiate deals and sign contracts to
do basically everything in their lives, from endorsement deals, to
public appearances, to roles in television shows, movies, and
advertisements. Requiring them to sign a contract or agreement
when they get tattoos would not place a great burden on them and
would resolve many of the conflicts that arise between their
constitutional interests and tattoo artists’ intellectual property
interests. The written agreement would define the ownership
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rights in the tattoo and dictate what the subject is entitled to do
with regards to the tattoo. For example, the agreement could allow
a subject to alter, modify or remove his or her tattoo without the
artist/owner’s permission, but could require that the subject obtain
permission if he or she wishes to appear in a commercial heavily
featuring the tattoo (such as in Reed).
In the case of celebrity tattoos, a writing requirement might
impose an undue burden on tattoo artists, who, unlike many
celebrities and public figures are not often equipped with an agent,
a manager and several attorneys, to counsel them every time they
apply a celebrity tattoo. However, given the amount and types of
conflicts that arise in tattoo infringement cases involving a highprofile celebrity, this may be a burden worth imposing to ensure
that ownership of the exclusive rights is clear.
A writing requirement would not pose a substantial burden for
non-celebrities who get tattoos, either. At least one state has
statutory requirements under its health laws stipulating that the
subject signs an informed consent form before receiving a “body
art procedure.”158 At the time the subject signs his consent form,
he could easily sign some kind of basic agreement recognizing, for
example, that the intellectual property interests in the tattoo belong
to the artist or to the tattoo parlor but that as the subject, he is
purchasing a license to display the work in public and to employ
other tattoo artists to prepare derivative works. In rare instances
where the subject wants to negotiate the assignment of the
intellectual property interests in the tattoo, a writing requirement
might impose a greater burden by adding time to the tattooing
process, and perhaps by requiring the parties to seek counsel.
a) Defining Ownership
Requiring a signed written instrument in the case of tattoos
would allow ownership to be more easily defined: first, by
explicitly stating the intent of the parties with regard to ownership,
and second, by satisfying the written requirement of works made
for hire (should this be the ownership arrangement into which the
parties desire to enter).
158

See MINN. STAT. § 146B.06(3) (2011).

C07_HATIC (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

1/5/2013 2:36 PM

WHO OWNS YOUR BODY ART?

429

b) Work For Hire
A work for hire arrangement with the subject as the author and
owner would solve many of the problems that arise from the
conflict between copyright ownership interests and the right of a
person to control his or her own body.159 If the subject is the
owner, he may freely modify or even remove the tattoo without
infringing on a copyright. It may be difficult and rare for a subject
to qualify as both the author and owner of a work for hire tattoo,
but in some situations, it seems certain subjects may meet the
statutory requirements. A work for hire is either prepared by an
employee within the scope of his employment or is a work
“specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work.”160
Where an already-tattooed person
commissions or specially orders another tattoo, his body, with
multiple tattoos, could arguably be classified as a “collective
work.”161 Although this interpretation of a collective work may be
a bit of a stretch, in such a situation, the multi-tattooed subject
could become the author of the new tattoo should the parties agree
to a work for hire arrangement and commemorate the agreement in
a written instrument signed by them.162 In this scenario, the
subject, as the author, would have the exclusive rights outlined in
section 106 and could, if he so chose, transfer some of his rights to
the tattoo artist.163 For instance, if the subject and the artist had an
ongoing relationship, the subject might grant the artist the right to
prepare any derivative works164 (for example, altering or adding to
the tattoo in the future). Requiring a written instrument before the
creation of an original tattoo would allow parties wishing to enter

159

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
A “collective work” is a work in which a number of contributions that constitute
separate and independent works, are assembled into a collective whole. 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2006). A work for hire arrangement only exists, however, “if the parties expressly agree
in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire.” Id.
161
See supra Part I.C.
162
17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).
163
17 U.S.C. § 201(d).
164
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
160
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into a work for hire relationship to clearly express this intent and to
satisfy the written requirement of the work for hire provision.165
c) Joint Work
Another ownership arrangement that would eliminate many of
the constitutional concerns with bodily autonomy, and
simultaneously preserve the creative interests of the artists, is a
joint work arrangement. When dealing with original tattoo
designs, oftentimes the subject will have the original idea for the
tattoo and will collaborate with the artist to finalize the design.166
For example, in the case with NBA star Rasheed Wallace, Wallace
presented the artist, Matthew Reed, with his idea for an arm tattoo
featuring an Egyptian family.167 Reed drew several sketches and,
throughout the design development process, Wallace commented
on and suggested changes to the sketches of the design.168
Joint works require the intention of both parties to merge their
separate copyrightable contributions into a single, unitary whole.169
If the artist and subject collaborated during the design process,
contributed copyrightable elements to the final product, and
intended their efforts to be merged into a single piece, they would
both be authors of the final product and would be co-owners with
equal rights for the purposes of copyright law.170 As a co-owner,
each party may use, or license someone else to use, the work,
provided that he account to the other co-owners for any profits
derived from such use or licensing.171 Signing an agreement
memorializing this joint work understanding would clarify the
rights of both parties and would eliminate many of the problems of
an artist’s exclusive ownership rights conflicting with the subject’s
right to control his own body. For example, the subject would be
permitted to appear in subsequent works, to find a different artist to
prepare derivative works and to allow others to copy the tattoo for

165
166
167
168
169
170
171

17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
See Reed Complaint, supra note 6, at 3–4.
Id.
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994).
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a licensing fee without infringing any of the exclusive rights under
section 106.
d) The Exclusive Rights Breakdown
Negotiating and signing a written agreement between the artist
and subject would also afford the parties the opportunity to transfer
ownership of certain exclusive rights.172 Even if the artist was
deemed the author and thus was initially vested with all copyright
ownership rights, through a written instrument he might transfer
some of the particular rights, the enforcement of which might
present the greatest conflict with the right to bodily autonomy.
This arrangement would consequently mitigate many of these
conflicts. For instance, the artist might choose to transfer the right
to prepare derivative works to the subject to avoid interfering with
the subject’s right to control his or her own body. Further, he
could transfer the right to publicly display the work to preserve the
subject’s right to publicity.
e) Implied Nonexclusive License
In cases where there is no written agreement and an artist
copyright owner claims infringement of his copyright for the use of
the tattoo in a subsequent work, courts should recognize an implied
nonexclusive license for the subject to appear in such works.173
Under section 204 of the Copyright Act, transfers of copyright
ownership must be in writing.174 However, nonexclusive licenses
may be granted orally or may be implied from conduct.175 Some
courts have recognized that an implied license results when (1) the
purported licensee requests the creation of the work, (2) the
copyright owner creates the work and delivers it to the licensee,

172

See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d).
The Copyright Act permits copyright holder to grant nonexclusive implied copyright
licenses. See Foad Consulting Grp. v. Musil Govan Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821, 825–26 (9th
Cir. 2001). See also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 10.03 (1989).
174
17 U.S.C. § 204 (2006).
175
See 3 NIMMER, supra note 173, § 10.03[A], at 10–36; see also Psihoyos v. Pearson
Educ., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 103, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
173
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and (3) the copyright owner intends the licensee to use the work as
the licensee does.176
A licensor-creator of a work who grants a nonexclusive
implied license does not transfer ownership of his copyrighted
work to the licensee;177 he merely allows the licensee to use the
work in a particular way.178 For instance, in the hypothetical
situation where a paparazzo snaps a photo of a celebrity bearing a
tattoo and then sells it to a newspaper that publishes the photo,
courts should recognize an implied nonexclusive license for
subjects to appear in such works. To find otherwise would be to
require that celebrities with tattoos cover up their body art every
time they appear in public or would require publishers of such
images to modify the images each time they published them. Not
only is this unreasonable and unduly burdensome, but also in the
case of facial tattoos such as Mike Tyson’s, it would be nearly
impossible. If a subject has a nonexclusive license to display his
tattoo, he has an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright
infringement by the artist/owner.179
Failing to recognize an implied license in instances where
tattooed subjects appear in public or in subsequent works would
counter the frequent goal of tattoo artists of using their subjects as
free promotion for their skill and business. For example, artist
Matthew Reed admitted he took a lower-than-usual fee for his
Egyptian tattoo on Rasheed Wallace’s arm because he knew that
he would benefit from the exposure of having his work displayed
on a popular NBA player’s body.180 Additionally, declining to
acknowledge an implied license would impede subjects’ abilities to
display themselves to the public in the way they desire and would
prevent them from “using” a work for which they paid.
Perhaps the only instance in which an implied license to
display the copyrighted work should not be recognized in the
176

See, e.g., Estate of Roberto Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2010);
Psihoyos, 855 F. Supp. 2d.
177
See I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996).
178
See id.
179
See Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 559 (9th Cir. 1990).
180
Associated Press, Artist Sues over Use of Tattoo, ESPN.COM (Feb. 16, 2005),
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/sportsbusiness/news/story?id=1992812.
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absence of a formal agreement is where the use of the copyrighted
tattoo is for a commercial purpose. For instance, in the Rasheed
Wallace tattoo case, Reed sued Nike for prominently featuring the
tattoo in an advertising campaign designed to promote Nike
products.181 This use was for a blatantly commercial purpose,
whereas the featuring of Mike Tyson and Ed Helms bearing
Tyson’s tattoo in The Hangover Part II was at best for the indirect
commercial purpose of making a more valuable film. Where the
subject or other party gains financially from the commercial
exploitation of the copyrighted tattoo, an implied license to use the
work seems inappropriate.182
f) Remedies
Monetary damages in the form of actual and statutory damages
present few problems in the tattoo infringement context.
Injunctive relief for infringement of tattoos stands to present the
greatest amount of constitutional problems and thus should be used
sparingly, if at all.
g) Actual and Statutory Damages
Awarding statutory damages to an artist copyright owner for
unauthorized direct copying of his design seems fair. However,
looking at the Mike Tyson case, for example, there may be many
difficulties in calculating actual damages in these situations. To be
entitled to actual damages in a copyright infringement case, a
copyright owner must show damages suffered as a result of the
infringement and the infringer’s profits attained as a result of the
infringement.183 Showing actual damages resulting from the direct

181

See Heller, supra note 89.
See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1994)
(noting that courts do not sustain fair use claims under section 107 where the secondary
use “can fairly be characterized as a form of ‘commercial exploitation,’ i.e. where the
copier directly and exclusively acquires conspicuous financial rewards from its use of the
copyrighted material”). Although American Geophysical’s discussion of commercial
exploitation was in the fair use context, the reasoning is analogous to the implied license
context; courts should not recognize an implied nonexclusive license to “use,” without
authorization, a copyrighted tattoo where the subsequent user (the subject) directly and
conspicuously profits from that unauthorized use.
183
17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006).
182
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copying onto Ed Helms’ face as well as in the instance of Mike
Tyson appearing in the film without permission seems difficult, if
not impossible. Further, none of the traditionally recognized forms
of actual damages occurred in either of these instances.184
However, in cases where a person commissions a copyrighted
tattoo from someone other than the owner and without the
permission of the owner, actual damages in the amount of the
tattoo application fee could be easily calculated, and the owner
would be entitled to at least those damages, on the grounds of lost
customers.185 In cases of the second instance of infringement (the
featuring of a copyrighted tattoo in a subsequent work), the
problem of calculating actual damages arises once more. In cases
where there are no actual damages, or actual damages are difficult
to calculate, certain infringement plaintiffs may recover under
statutory damages.
Only those owners who registered their copyrights in their
tattoos before infringement occurred are entitled to statutory
damages.186 Where the court finds willful infringement, it may, in
its discretion, raise the maximum amount of statutory damages
from $30,000 to $150,000 for each work it finds to have been
infringed.187
2. Injunctive Relief
Certain types of injunctions, namely those that would interfere
with a person’s right to control his own body, should not be
granted to plaintiffs in tattoo infringement cases, even where the
court finds infringement. For example, if the artist is the owner of
the copyright, he should not be able to demand that a subject cover
up the tattoo when appearing in public or in movies,
advertisements, or photos on the grounds that it interferes with his
exclusive right to display the work publicly. He also should not be
entitled to an injunction demanding the removal of a tattoo that has
been altered without his permission on the grounds that it has
184

See supra Part I.F.2.
See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Applied Innovations, 685 F. Supp. 698,
711–12 (D. Minn. 1987).
186
17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006).
187
17 U.S.C. § 505(c)(2) (2006).
185
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infringed his right to prepare derivative works. Allowing such
injunctive relief would unreasonably and impermissibly interfere
with the constitutional right of the subject to control his own body.
In assessing requests to enjoin the release of works such as
movies or advertisements that feature a copyrighted tattoo, courts
should consider the public interest in addition to the interests of the
owner and the subject. For example, in Whitmill’s case, Judge
Perry appropriately balanced all the competing interests. She
recognized Whitmill’s copyright interest in the Tyson tattoo, but
also recognized that the public interest in having The Hangover
Part II released far outweighed any intellectual property interest he
had in the work.188 In other words, when evaluating requests for
injunctions in cases like this, courts must remember that the
Copyright Act aims not only to provide an incentive to create and
to protect such creations, but also to promote subsequent creative
works that build upon existing original works.
CONCLUSION
Due to the unique interests associated with, and constitutional
problems raised by tattoos, their copyright protection must be
treated differently than that of more traditional copyrightable
works. Requiring, or at least encouraging, written instruments in
conjunction with tattoo creation, or recognizing implied
nonexclusive licenses in original tattoos would help to mitigate
these conflicts.

188

Cohen, supra note 90.

